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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article étudie les externalités de recherche verticales entre des firmes en amont et
des firmes en aval. Il y a deux industries verticalement reliées, avec des externalités
horizontales au sein de chaque industrie et des externalités verticales entre les deux
industries. Quatre structures de coopération en R&D sont considérées : pas de coopération,
coopération horizontale, coopération verticale, et coopération horizontale et verticale
simultanément. Les externalités verticales augmentent la R&D et le bien-être, alors que les
externalités horizontales peuvent les augmenter ou les diminuer. La comparaison des
structures de coopération en terme de R&D révèle qu’aucune structure ne domine
uniformément les autres. Le classement des structures de coopération dépend des
externalités horizontales et verticales, et de la concurrence. Le classement dépend des signes
et magnitudes de trois externalités concurrentielles (verticale, horizontale et diagonale) qui
captent l’effet de la R&D d’une firme sur les profits des autres firmes. Un des résultats de base
de la littérature sur l’investissement stratégique est que la coopération entre concurrents
augmente (diminue) la R&D lorsque les externalités horizontales sont élevées (faibles) ; le
modèle montre que ce résultat n’est pas toujours vérifié en présence des externalités
verticales et/ou de la coopération verticale. Le papier propose une théorie reliant le degré
d’innovation à la structure du marché : la relation entre la concurrence et l’innovation dépend
des externalités horizontales, des externalités verticales et de la structure de coopération. Les
incitations privées à la coopération en R&D sont examinées; on montre que les vendeurs et
les acheteurs ont des préférences différentes quant au choix de structure de coopération et
que les externalités augmentent la vraisemblance de l’émergence décentralisée de la
coopération.
Mots clés : externalités de recherche verticales, structure de marché, innovation, coopération
verticale en R&D, politique de R&D
ABSTRACT
This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms.
The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each
industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are
studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous
horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while
horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings
in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of
cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market
structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three
competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D
of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment
literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal
spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when
vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a
theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and
competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The
private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have
divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the
likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.
Key words : vertical R&D spillovers, market structure, innovation, vertical R&D cooperation,
R&D policy
Some of the issues examined are absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), price vs. quantity competition
2
(Delbono and Denicolo, 1990), Stackelberg leadership (Goel, 1990), process vs. product innovation (Levin and Reiss, 1988), partial
cartelization (Kamien and Zang, 1993; Poyago-Theotoky, 1995; De Bondt and Wu, 1997), asymmetric firms (Rosen, 1991; Poyago-
Theotoky, 1996), asymmetric spillovers (Jarmin, 1993), and spillovers between demand unrelated industries (Steurs, 1994; 1995).
Kamien et al. (1992) generalize this framework and study different combinations of cooperation and information sharing.
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1. Introduction
Lately there has been an intensification of Research Joint Ventures and technological alliances
between firms. For instance, Hagedoorn et al. (2000) note that the number of new technology
partnerships set up annually went from 30-40 in the early 1970s to around 600 during the 1980s and
1990s. Appropriability is an important dimension of R&D which has been the subject of a large
theoretical and empirical literature. Although spillover analysis can be traced back to Ruff (1969), the
modern theoretical treatment of the subject builds on the seminal papers by Spence (1984) and
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
Many variants of this basic model have been studied.  Almost all of the studies in the strategic2
investment literature deal with horizontal spillovers between competing firms. Spillovers between buyers
and sellers, which I call vertical spillovers, are one instance of interindustry spillovers. The main
difference between horizontal and vertical spillovers is that the former are involuntary and (generally)
undesirable from the point of view of the innovating firm, whereas the latter are desirable (and are more
often voluntary). Another difference is that while horizontal R&D cooperation may mitigate competition
between firms, and is often closely monitored by competition authorities, vertical cooperation is less
likely to hinder competition. Intraindustry cooperation is generally sufficient for firms to internalize
horizontal spillovers. However, the internalization of vertical spillovers requires interindustry
coordination. When vertical and horizontal spillovers are linked, a strong patent protection policy aiming
at prohibiting competitors from acquiring the innovation may also harm vertically related firms (as well
as firms in demand unrelated industries).
Whereas the empirical literature shows that vertical technological flows are significant, little
theoretical treatment has focussed on this dimension of appropriability. Two exceptions are Peters (1995)
and Harhoff (1991). Peters (1995) studies a model of vertical spillovers. He finds that more concentrated
industries tend to spend more on R&D (however, this result may be reversed for high values of
interindustry spillovers and some specific values of horizontal spillovers), horizontal spillovers may
increase or decrease R&D, and vertical spillovers increase R&D investments, profits, and welfare. The
model suffers from some restrictive assumptions: spillovers are in one direction only, from suppliers to
customers; upstream firms do not benefit from their own R&D investments: all benefits accrue to
downstream firms; upstream firms cannot adjust their output to their R&D investments; finally,
cooperation is not addressed. In a related paper Becker and Peters (1995) study R&D competition
between two vertical corporate networks in a patent race framework.
Harhoff (1991) studies a model of product R&D spillovers between vertically related industries.
He finds that upstream and downstream R&D are generally substitutes: with an exogenous market
structure and perfect vertical spillovers (in one direction only), only one of the two industries spends on
This is contrary to the results of Steurs (1994,1995), Peters (1995), and -as will be seen- our model, where it is found
3
that there is a strong complementarity between interindustry research efforts.
Vertical R&D cooperation has been briefly addressed in the agricultural economics literature. See Freebairn et al. (1982)
4
and Alston and Scobie (1983).
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imperfectly appropriable R&D.  However, his model suffers from some restrictive assumptions. The3
presence of a Stackelberg upstream monopolist makes the results applicable only to very asymmetric
markets. Moreover, this market structure makes it impossible to study upstream horizontal spillovers
along with downstream horizontal spillovers. Another restrictive assumption is that when (downstream)
horizontal spillovers are allowed for, upstream prices are fixed exogenously. Moreover, vertical
spillovers are perfect, and they accrue only from the seller to the buyers. Finally, cooperation is not
addressed.4
This paper studies vertical spillovers, allowing for different market structures, appropriability
conditions, and types of cooperation. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with
horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries, in a three-
stage game theoretic framework. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, this is the first paper
to formalize vertical spillovers in a relatively general framework. Second, the study of cooperation goes
further than existing studies by considering four different cooperative structures: no cooperation,
interindustry and intraindustry cooperation, interindustry cooperation only, and intraindustry cooperation
only. Finally, the paper addresses market structure explicitly, and provides a theory of innovation and
market structure. The paper incorporates a large number of issues: horizontal spillovers, vertical
spillovers, R&D cooperation, market structure, endogenous cooperation. While this complicates the
analysis and presentation of the results, I believe that omitting any of these variables would obscure some
of the most important parts of the problem, such as the interplay between R&D cooperation, spillovers,
and market structure.
Here is a summary of the main findings of the paper. Vertical spillovers affect R&D investments
directly and indirectly, through their influence on the impact of horizontal spillovers and of R&D
cooperation. Whereas horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease innovation and welfare depending
on prevailing cooperation types, vertical spillovers always increase them. Cooperative settings are
compared in terms of R&D. It is shown that no type of cooperation uniformly dominates the others. The
type of cooperation yielding more R&D depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and market
structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive
externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the
profits of other firms. The type of cooperation inducing firms to internalize a larger positive sum of
competitive externalities yields more R&D. In particular, one of the basic results of the strategic
investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when
horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when
vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. A theory of innovation and market
structure is proposed: the effect of competition in one industry on total innovation depends on horizontal
spillovers, vertical spillovers, cooperative settings, and competition in the other industry. The relation
between competition and innovation can be understood in terms of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
competitive externalities. Finally, the analysis of the private incentives for cooperation shows that buyers
and sellers have different preferences over cooperative settings: sellers prefer vertical cooperation,
whereas buyers (generally) prefer horizontal cooperation. Higher spillovers increase the likelihood of
The ongoing trend toward more outsourcing increases the importance of the study of vertical spillovers. When firms had
5
higher levels of vertical integration, a good part of vertical spillovers were internalized. However, with outsourcing, spillovers which
were intra-firm become inter-firm/interindustry spillovers.
Suzuki finds that spillovers from the core firm to its subcontractors are significant: a percentage increase in technology
6
transfer reduces the unit variable cost of the subcontractor by 0.09%. In the study of a sample of 208 Japanese manufacturing firms,
Branstetter (199?) finds that production keiretsu promote innovative activity, as measured by firm-level spending on research and
development. Moreover, he finds evidence that affiliation with production keiretsu groups promotes the exchange of technological
knowledge across firms within groups.
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cooperation, but the multiplicity of equilibria makes the decentralized choice of socially optimal
cooperative settings uncertain.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on vertical spillovers and
vertical cooperation. The model is presented and solved in section 3. Comparative statics are studied in
section 4. Section 5 compares R&D expenditures between types of cooperation. In section 6 the relation
between market structure and innovation is addressed. The private incentives for cooperation are studied
in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
There is ample evidence that interindustry spillovers -of which vertical spillovers are one instance-
are significant. Bernstein (1988) and Jaffe (1986) find that interindustry spillovers have more effects on
cost reduction than intraindustry spillovers. Bernstein finds that unit costs decrease more in response to
an increase in intraindustry (interindustry) spillovers in industries with large (small) R&D cost shares.
Pavitt (1984) finds that out of 2,000 innovations in the UK, only 40% emanated from the sector using
the innovation.
Some evidence points more explicitly to vertical spillovers.  Goto and Suzuki (1989) find that5
in the electronics industry, technological diffusion through spillovers is more important than
technological diffusion through inputs. Ward and Dranove (1995) find important vertical spillovers
within the American pharmaceutical industry. Suzuki (1993) and Branstetter (199?) find significant
vertical spillovers in Japanese keiretsu.  As Mohnen notes: “Interindustry knowledge spillovers are more6
likely to occur ... when one innovation naturally calls for the development of complementary products
or innovations in an upstream input supply sector in order to reach its full potential.” (Mohnen, 1989:5)
The role of vertically related firms in the development of new technologies is well documented.
In the auto industry, much of the innovation comes from suppliers (Jorde and Teece, 1990). Clark et al.
(1987) show the importance of the role played by die suppliers for new product development by Japanese
automobile firms. Vanderwerf (1992) shows that upstream firms often create downstream innovations,
even when the direct profit from the innovation accrues to downstream firms. This can be explained by
the increase in final demand due to the innovation. Von Hippel (1988) finds that more than two thirds
of first-to-market innovations concerning scientific instruments and process machinery in semiconductor
and electronic subassembly manufacturing are dominated by end-users.
In some cases the complementarity between upstream and downstream innovation is sufficiently
strong to require explicit vertical cooperation. “Vertical research joint ventures ..(RJVs), which
p ' a&w'mi'1ybi
The vertical chain contains only two industries for the sake of simplicity, but this assumption can also be justified by
7
the empirical result that even though interindustry spillovers are important, each industry receives spillovers from a limited range
of industries (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1988). 
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constitute a substantial fraction of RJVs, are designed to bring together complementary assets, usually
research capacity and manufacturing or marketing” (Aghion and Tirole, 1993:7). Vertical technological
cooperation is widely observed. It is sometimes argued that the high levels of vertical cooperation in the
Japanese economy are responsible for much of Japan’s competitive edge (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). Sako
(1995) argues that inter-supplier coordination (through kyoryokukai) in the Japanese automotive industry
is also important. Moreover, suppliers with above (below) average technological capabilities prefer
vertical (horizontal) technological cooperation. This is to be expected, since mutual learning between
suppliers is more valuable when there is no fear of information leakage to competitors. Cassiman and
Veugelers (1998), from the study of a sample of firms from the Belgian manufacturing industry, find that
most cooperative agreements are vertical or with research institutes, rather than horizontal; they find that
vertical cooperation is driven by the search for external knowledge and complementarities, rather than
by sharing high costs or high risks of research. Veugelers (1993) finds that vertical relations account for
38% of Joint Ventures and for 25% of cooperative agreements. Since its foundation, SEMATECH (the
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium) has shifted from horizontal to vertical
cooperation (Grindley et al., 1994).
Vertical cooperation has an important legal dimension. American antitrust laws are more
restrictive regarding inter-firm technological cooperation than their European and Japanese counterparts
(Jorde and Teece, 1990, 1992). For instance, European antitrust authorities grant cooperative R&D
agreements exemption from Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome governing broad aspects of competition
among firms. The exemption applies for five years, regardless of market share, if the participants are
vertically related and do not compete directly in the relevant market.
3. The model
The standard duopoly framework used in much of the strategic investment literature is quite
restrictive. Here we use a more general market structure, for both upstream and downstream industries.
This allows us to see how changes in market structure affect the relative desirability of different types
of R&D cooperation. Indeed, it will be shown that this comparison depends critically on market
structure. Also, this allows us to analyze the effects of spillovers and cooperation on the relation between
market structure and innovation. This yields results that are related to the literature studying the effect
of the technological environment on the Schumpeterian hypothesis.
There are m identical buyers of a standardized input, and n identical suppliers providing this
input. This market structure is given, so entry issues are put aside. If no R&D is undertaken, suppliers
incur a constant unit production cost of s and sell the input at a unit price of t to buyers. Buyers pay the
suppliers t for each unit bought, and incur an additional internal production cost of r. Finally, buyers sell
the product to consumers at price p.  Buyers face the linear inverse demand7
where y  denotes buyer’s i output.bi
cbi ' t%r&xbi&h'
m
j…i xbj&v'
n
i'1xsi.
csi ' s&xsi&h'
n
j…i xsj&v'
m
i'1xbi.
r > xbi%h'
m
j…i xbj%v'
n
i'1xsi, i'1,...,m
s > xsi%h'
n
j…i xsj%v'
m
i'1xbi, i'1,...,n.
See, for instance, Kamien and Schwartz, 1982. However, this issue remains controversial; see Nadiri, 1993.
8
An important difference with Peters (1995) is that Peters assumes that vertical spillovers accrue only from suppliers to
9
customers. However, there is no a priori reason why vertical spillovers should not be bi-directional. For instance, Suzuki (1993)
finds vertical spillovers in both directions between core firms and their subcontractors in keiretsu.
Spillovers from a firm need not be limited to its own buyers/suppliers. Suzuki (1993) identifies spillovers between the
10
core firm in a keiretsu and the subcontractors belonging to other keiretsus. A percentage increase in technology transfer reduces
the unit variable cost of the subcontractors by 0.11%, an even larger spillover than between the firm and its own subcontractors.
Those vertical spillovers (although in the second case one should speak of cross or diagonal spillovers) are found to be even more
important than technological transfers between core firms from different keiretsus (horizontal spillovers), which are of the order
of 0.08%. Keiretsu provide an example where vertical spillovers are just as important empirically as, perhaps even more important
than, horizontal spillovers.
Imperfect spillovers can represent imperfect information leakage, the productivity of transferred knowledge (Peters,
11
1995), novelty requirements (Henriques, 1991), perfect information leakage with an absorption cost (for instance Levin et al. (1987)
find that patents raise imitation costs and time), or perfect information leakage with differences in technology which cause only
some of the information to be useful.
5
Firms can engage in cost-reducing R&D activities. The dollar cost of x units of R&D for firm i
is ux , where x represents the R&D output of firm i, and u>0 represents a cost parameter. It is assumedi i
2
that u is sufficiently high for the profit function to be concave, and sufficiently low for firms to choose
strictly positive amounts of R&D. Convex R&D costs can be justified by the observation of decreasing
returns to scale in R&D.  With quadratic costs, many small research labs will be more cost effective than8
one big research unit. However, each firm is assumed to operate exactly one research lab, for the sake
of simplicity. Total R&D output will be denoted X.
Each unit of R&D by a firm reduces its own cost by one dollar, reduces the cost of each of its
competitors by h dollars (horizontal spillovers), and reduces the cost of each firm in the other industry
by v dollars (vertical spillovers), with h,v0[0,1]. The spillovers h and v can differ for many factors:9 10 11
different absorptive capacities between suppliers/distributors and competitors, different levels of
technological complementarities, differences in the efficiency of communication channels, and linkages
between the degree of information leakage and the type of inter-firm interaction. The unit cost of
production of a downstream firm is
The unit cost of production of an upstream firm is 
Consequently, the final unit cost of a firm depends on its R&D choice as well as on that of all other firms.
Buyers benefit from sellers’ R&D through a reduction in the cost of their input, and through vertical
spillovers. Sellers benefit from buyers’ R&D through the reduction in buyers’ cost, and through vertical
spillovers. Note that whereas R&D expenses are independent of output, its benefits are linked to output,
since the higher output is, the higher the number of units that benefit from cost reduction.
Parameters are assumed to be such that the following nonnegativity constraints are satisfied:
These constraints ensure that production costs after R&D is undertaken are strictly positive. The game
Maxybi Bbi ' (p(Y)&cbi)ybi&ux
2
bi
ybi '
a&t&r%(m&(m&1)h )xbi&(1&2h)'
m
j…i xbj%v'
n
i'1xsi
w(m%1)
p '
a%m(t%r)&(1%(m&1)h)'mi'1xbi&mv'
n
i'1xsi
m%1
t '
m(a&r)%(1%(m&1)h)'mi'1xbi%mv'
n
i'1xsi&w(m%1)'
n
i'1ysi
m
Maxysi Bsi ' (t(Y)&csi)ysi&ux
2
si.
The use of a sequential model is one of the restrictive assumptions of the model. A simultaneous game for vertically
12
related firms would avoid "the potentially restrictive assignment of leader-follower roles required by the Stackelberg solution."
(Young, 1991:717). However, in a vertical market with prices as strategic variables, no equilibrium can be obtained in a
simultaneous game; a simultaneous game would require the use of markups, not prices, as strategic variables (Young, 1991; Irmen,
1997). Other negotiation mechanisms could be used to obtain simultaneous output decisions between buyers and sellers. However,
for the purpose of obtaining results which are comparable with other studies in this literature, and to maintain tractability, it is
assumed that firms compete in output, implying sellers’ leadership.
6
(1)
(2)
(3)
has three stages: one R&D stage and two output stages. In the first stage all firms decide on their R&D
simultaneously. In the second stage upstream firms compete in Cournot, taking into account the derived
demand curve of the downstream industry. In the third stage there is a Cournot game among all
downstream firms, taking the price of the intermediate good as given. The output stages follow the
successive oligopoly structure suggested by Greenhut and Ohta (1979). The price of the intermediate
good is determined by Cournot competition in the upstream industry, based on the derived demand curve
of buyers. In horizontal models of R&D investments, the output game is generally assumed to be
simultaneous. Here, however, the vertical structure of the market implies that sellers are Stackelberg
leaders.12
3.1 Output stages
We begin with the third stage where buyers decide non-cooperatively on their output,
guaranteeing the perfectness of the equilibrium. Buyers’s i problem is
where Y/y +...+y . Given that buyers are identical ex ante, they take the same decisions ex post.b1 bm
Simultaneous maximization of (1) for i=1,...,m and solving of the m f.o.c. yields
From (2) we derive the inverse demand curve suppliers face
We now turn to the second stage of the game, where suppliers decide non-cooperatively on their
output, based on the derived inverse demand of downstream firms (3). Supplier i solves the following
problem:
The identical costs of sellers imply that they will occupy identical positions ex post. Maximization and
ysi '
m(a&r&s)%(1%(m&1)h%mv)'mi'1xbi%m(n&(n&1)h%v)xsi%m(&1%2h%v)'
n
j…i xsj
w(mn%m%n%1)
Y '
mn(a&r&s)%n(1%(m&1)h%mv)'mi'1xbi%m(1%(n&1)h%nv)'
n
i'1xsi
w(mn%m%n%1)
p '
(m%n%1)a%mn(r%s)&n(1%(m&1)h%mv)'mi'1xbi&m(1%(n&1)h%nv)'
n
i'1xsi
mn%m%n%1
.
t '
m(a&r%ns)%(1%(m&1)h&mnv)'mi'1xbi&m(1%(n&1)h&v)'
n
i'1xsi
m(n%1)
.
Bbi ' (p($)&cbi($))ybi($)&ux
2
bi.
Bsi ' (t($)&csi($))ysi($)&ux
2
si.
Note that t depends on the number of downstream firms; this is due to the presence of R&D. In the absence of R&D,13
with a linear demand (and also with a log-linear demand), t is independent of m (Choe, 1998).
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simultaneous solving of the n f.o.c. yields
Given that each unit bought from suppliers is transformed into one unit sold by buyers to consumers,
total output is the same for upstream and downstream industries. Total output is
and the final price is
The price charged by suppliers is13
3.2 R&D stage
In the first stage of the game all firms decide simultaneously on R&D levels. Whereas output is
always chosen non-cooperatively, four types of cooperation (TOC) will be considered for R&D
decisions: a non-cooperative equilibrium (NCE), a generalized cooperative equilibrium (GCE), a
horizontal cooperative equilibrium (HCE), and a vertical cooperative equilibrium (VCE). Figure 1
illustrates the different TOC. Note that in all four environments the source and destination (and also the
level) of spillovers is independent of the TOC. That is, even when there are cooperating groups of firms,
spillovers originate and end at individual firms. This is in contrast to empirical modelisation, where
spillovers originate from industries.
[Figure 1 here]
Horizontal cooperation (HC) represents cooperation with competitors, while vertical cooperation
(VC) represents cooperation with suppliers/distributors. Generalized cooperation (GC) reflects the
complexity of some research joint ventures: with the multiplication of research projects, firms may be
adopting more than one structure simultaneously. Firms may engage in HC on one project, and in VC
on another project. Many cooperative agreements involve both horizontal and vertical linkages. For
instance, cooperation with a competitor may involve working with its suppliers.
Let $/{x ,...,x ,x ,...,x }. Using the results of the second and third stages, we can write profitb1 bm s1 sn
functions as functions of $. The profit of buyer i is
The profit of seller i is 
Maxxbi Bbi
Maxxsi Bsi
x NCsi '
m 2(1%m)(h%v%n&hn)(a&r&s)
(NC
x NCbi '
n(1&h&m 2%hm 2&hmn&vmn&m 2n%hm 2n)(&a%r%s)
(NC
(NC ' &hm 2%h 2m 2&vm 2%hvm 2&hm 3%h 2m 3&vm 3%hvm 3%n&2hn%h 2n%hmn
&h 2mn%vmn&hvmn&2m 2n%4hm 2n&3h 2m 2n&2hvm 2n&v 2m 2n&m 3n%hm 3n
&h 2m 3n&vm 3n&hvm 3n&v 2m 3n&hmn 2%h 2mn 2&vmn 2%hvmn 2&m 2n 2
%hm 2n 2&h 2m 2n 2&vm 2n 2&hvm 2n 2&v 2m 2n 2&2hm 3n 2%2h 2m 3n 2&2vm 3n 2
%2hvm 3n 2%uw(m%2m 2%m 3%2mn%4m 2n%2m 3n%mn 2%2m 2n 2%m 3n 2)
Max
$
'
m
i'1Bbi % '
n
i'1Bsi
x GCbi '
&(1&h%hm%vm)n(1%m%n)(a&r&s)
(GC
x GCsi '
m(1%m%n)(1&h%hn%vn)(&a%r%s)
(GC
The Salant and Shaffer (1998) critique of the use of symmetric R&D strategies does not apply here, because there are
14
no side payments and there is only one output market. Moreover, the very idea of side payments goes counter to the pre-competitive
nature of R&D collaboration.
Under all TOC, R&D expenditures depend on the sum r+s, not on the distribution of these two activities between15
upstream and downstream firms. Therefore, changes in the frontiers of firms have no effect on R&D or welfare, subject to the fact
that the constraint of nonnegativity of costs is nonbinding.
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(4)
           (5)
(6)
In the first TOC, the NCE, each firm chooses its R&D so as to maximize its own profits, given
that other firms do the same. The problem of buyer i is 
and the problem of seller i is 
Maximization and simultaneous solving of the m+n f.o.c. of (4) and (5) yield research efforts in the NCE
by each buyer and each seller:14 15
where
In the GCE each firm chooses its R&D to maximize the total profits of all firms:
Maximization of (6) with respect to x , i=1,...,m and x , i=1,...,n yields research efforts in the GCE:bi si
where
(GC ' m&2hm%h 2m%m 2&2hm 2%h 2m 2%n&2hn%h 2n%2mn&2h 2mn
%4vmn&4hvmn%4hm 2n&3h 2m 2n%4vm 2n&2hvm 2n%v 2m 2n%h 2m 3n%2hvm 3n
%v 2m 3n%n 2&2hn 2%h 2n 2%4hmn 2&3h 2mn 2%4vmn 2&2hvmn 2%v 2mn 2
%2h 2m 2n 2%4hvm 2n 2%2v 2m 2n 2%h 2mn 3%2hvmn 3%v 2mn 3
&uw(1%2m%m 2%2n%4mn%2m 2n%n 2%2mn 2%m 2n 2)
Maxxb1,...,xbm '
m
i'1 Bbi
Maxxs1,...,xsn '
n
i'1 Bsi
x HCbi '
(1&h%hm%vm)n 2(&a%r%s)
(HC
x HCsi '
m(1%m)(1&h%hn%vn)(&a%r%s)
(HC
(HC ' m&2hm%h 2m%m 2&2hm 2%h 2m 2%2hmn&2h 2mn%2vmn&2hvmn%2hm 2n
&2h 2m 2n%2vm 2n&2hvm 2n%n 2&2hn 2%h 2n 2%2hmn 2&h 2mn 2%2vmn 2%v 2mn 2
%2h 2m 2n 2%4hvm 2n 2%2v 2m 2n 2&uw(1%2m%m 2%2n%4mn%2m 2n%n 2%2mn 2%m 2n 2)
Maxxbi,xsi Bbi%Bsi
x VCbi '
(n 2%vn 2%n 3%hn 3%2vn 3%n 4&hn 4)(a&r&s)
(VC
x VCsi '
n(n%vn%n 2%hn 2%2vn 2%n 3&hn 3)(a&r&s)
(VC
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(7)
(8)
(9)
In the HCE there is intraindustry cooperation but no interindustry cooperation. Buyers solve 
and sellers solve
Simultaneous solving of the m+n f.o.c. of (7) and (8) yields research efforts in the HCE:
where
In the VCE there is interindustry cooperation, but no intraindustry cooperation. Each buyer
cooperates with one seller, but buyers do not cooperate among themselves, nor do sellers. Given that
buyers are identical, as well as sellers, it is irrelevant which buyer cooperates with each seller. The VCE
requires m=n to exclude asymmetric strategies. Without loss of generality, let bi cooperate with si,
i=1,...,m (m=n). Firms bi and si maximize
Following the maximization of (9) we find research efforts in the VCE to be
where
(VC ' &2n 2%2hn 2&2vn 2%2hvn 2&2n 3&2hn 3%2h 2n 3&6vn 3%2hvn 3&2v 2n 3&2n 4
%2hn 4&4h 2n 4&2vn 4&6hvn 4&4v 2n 4&2hn 5%2h 2n 5&2vn 5%2hvn 5
%uw(n%4n 2%6n 3%4n 4%n 5)
Note that we focus on R&D output, not effective (produced+received) R&D. While the latter is more meaningful from
16
a social point of view, R&D output is more amenable to empirical testing. Moreover, in this type of model there is generally a
monotonic relationship between effective spillovers and welfare, therefore the welfare analysis implicitly addresses effective
spillovers.
This figure, and all other numerical simulations in the paper, are based on the following numerical parameterization
17
of the model: a=1000, w=1, r=s=50, u=600.
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The following sections analyse the results derived above.
4. Comparative statics
The question addressed in this section is: what is the effect of changes in vertical and horizontal
spillovers on R&D and welfare,  under different TOC? This analysis is performed in a bilateral duopoly16
framework. Proposition 1 summarises the effects of spillovers on R&D and welfare.
Proposition 1. Let m=n=2. Then
i) Vertical spillovers always increase R&D by all firms, as well as welfare.
ii) Horizontal spillovers increase R&D by all firms in the GCE and the HCE, and reduce R&D by all
firms in the NCE and the VCE.
iii) Horizontal spillovers increase welfare in all three cooperative equilibria (even when they reduce
R&D), and have an ambiguous effect on welfare in the NCE.
iv) A simultaneous and equal increase in horizontal and vertical spillovers (starting from the same
level) reduces x  and increases x  in the NCE (with an ambiguous effect on total R&D), and increasesbi si
R&D by all firms in all other TOC.
v) In the NCE and the VCE, v reinforces the negative effect of h, and h mitigates the positive effect of
v. In the GCE and the HCE, h and v reinforce the positive effects of each other.
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics of the model. Comparative statics are obtained by
substituting m=n=2 into the solutions for R&D and performing the relevant differentiations. Figure 2
illustrates the effect of h and v on total R&D.17
[Figure 2 here]
Vertical spillovers can have a (negligible) negative effect on a firm. When v increases, the flow of spillovers to the firm18
from its suppliers/distributors increases, but the same also applies to competitors. When firms are identical, the positive effect of
the reduction in own cost dominates the marginal negative effect of the reduction in competitors’ (and the competitors’ suppliers)
costs. In a situation with strong asymmetries between firms, it could be the case that small firms lose from v, because most of the
benefits go to their competitors, deteriorating further their initial cost disadvantage. Moreover, when a large firm has many
suppliers, suppliers may worry about information leakage to the buyer, since this information may go to the supplier’s competitors.
Such a concern has arisen within SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium), where Semiconductor
materials and equipment suppliers sharing information with SEMATECH members feared of information leakage to their
competitors (Grindley et al., 1994).
In the case of the derivatives Mx /Mh and Mx /Mh, it could not be formally proved that they are always negative, however19 VC VCbi s i
numerical simulations show that whenever any of them is positive at least one of the nonnegativity constraints on costs is violated.
11
Table 1- Summary of comparative statics (m=n=2)
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
Mx /Mvbi + + + +
Mx /Mvsi + + + +
MW/Mv + + + +
Mx /Mhbi - + + -
Mx /Mhsi - + + -
MW/Mh ± + + +
Mx (h=g)/Mhbi - + + +
Mx (h=g)/Mhsi + + + +
MX(h=g)/Mh ± + + +
M X/MhMv2 - + + -
An increase in v increases R&D by all firms, in all equilibria. As v increases, the flow of spillovers
between the two industries increases, reducing the costs of all firms; this reduction in costs translates into
an increase in output. This increase in output increases the value of cost reduction, inducing a further
increase in R&D. In contrast to h, vertical spillovers benefit all firms, and induce no disincentives for cost
reduction.18
In the NCE and the VCE, an increase in h reduces the private benefit from R&D, thereby
reducing R&D by all firms.  However, vertical cooperation reduces the negative effects of horizontal19
spillovers. Formally, in general we have that *MX /Mh*<*MX /Mh*: horizontal spillovers reduce R&DVC NC
spending less under vertical cooperation than under no cooperation. With vertical cooperation, cost
reduction is more highly valued, therefore leakages to competitors reduce R&D to a lesser degree than
in the absence of cooperation. In the GCE and the HCE, there is intraindustry cooperation, and,
consequently, the positive externality is internalized: an increase in h increases R&D by all firms.
Note the asymmetric effects of spillovers on R&D: MX/Mh<0 when there is no intraindustry
cooperation (NC or VC), whereas MX/Mv>0 even without interindustry cooperation (NC or HC).
Steurs (1994,1995) finds that the total effect of an increase in intra and interindustry spillovers is ambiguous, and is
20
more likely to be positive for lower levels of spillovers.
Steurs (1994,1995) also finds that spillovers between demand independent industry, although they affect R&D
21
positively, reinforce the negative effect of intraindustry spillovers.
12
Consider next the effect of a simultaneous and equal increase in vertical and horizontal spillovers
(dh=dv). Here h and v increase equally and simultaneously, assuming they are initially at the same level.
This result is useful in a context where (desirable) leakage of information to suppliers implies the
(undesirable) leakage of the same information to competitors. That effect is obtained by setting h=v and
differentiating with respect to the spillover level. As table 1 shows, in the three cooperative equilibria
all firms increase their R&D. In the NCE, buyers decrease, and sellers increase, their R&D. Remember
that, in the NCE, an increase in (only) v increased R&D by all firms whereas an increase in (only) h
decreased R&D by all firms. This means that, when both types of spillovers increase simultaneously, the
positive effect of v dominates for sellers, while the negative effect of h dominates for buyers. The effect
on total R&D is ambiguous, depending on which dominates between the increase in R&D by sellers and
the decrease in R&D by buyers.20
However, further analysis shows that the effect of a simultaneous increase in h and v in the NCE
and the VCE tends to become negative as competition intensifies, due to the negative effect of non
internalized h on R&D. Therefore, when the diffusion of technological information to vertically related
firms makes this information available to competitors, and this (horizontal) externality is not internalized,
it is preferable to limit the diffusion of information.
There is an -asymmetric- interaction between the effects of h and v. In the NCE and the VCE,
M X/MhMv<0, meaning that v reinforces the negative effect of h, and that h mitigates the positive effect2
of v.  In this case not only does h reduce R&D, but it also mitigates the positive effect of v. In the GCE21
and the HCE, M X/MhMv>0: h and v reinforce the positive effects of each other.2
The effects of appropriability on profits and welfare depends on who benefits from information
leakages (competitors or vertically related firms) and the prevailing TOC. In all three cooperative
equilibria, an increase in h always increases profits, consumer surplus and welfare. This is true even
though MX /Mh<0. In the NCE, MW /Mh 0 even though MX /Mh<0. At low levels of h, increases in hVC NC > NC<
benefit firms and consumers. This suggests that appropriability problems that induce firms to refrain from
innovating are not necessarily undesirable, given that this loss in innovation is more than compensated
for by the increase in knowledge received by other firms. For very high levels of h, however, the
reduction in R&D is so drastic that welfare suffers. In some cases, firms may be benefiting from the
increase in h at the expense of consumers. Thus, the effect of changes in h on welfare depends on its
initial level. This analytical ambiguity of the effect of h on prices and costs is in contrast to the empirical
finding that spillovers generally induce output expansions and price reductions.
On the other hand, in all TOC, an increase in v always increases profits, consumer surplus, and
welfare. These findings are consistent with those of Peters (1995) and Steurs (1994,1995).
5. Comparison of cooperative structures
In this section the different types of cooperation are compared in terms of R&D. This comparison
H /
MBb2
Mxb1
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Mxb2
%
MBs2
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V /
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is important given that in the literature, most studies have focussed on comparing cooperation vs. no
cooperation. However, the choices firms face with respect to R&D cooperation are much more complex
than this binary decision. Firms must decide not only whether to cooperate or not, but also with whom
to cooperate. Two important potential partners for cooperation are competitors and suppliers/customers.
The four types of R&D cooperation studied in this paper are: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation,
vertical cooperation, and generalized (simultaneous horizontal and vertical) cooperation. They have been
explained in detail in section 3.
R&D cooperation induces firms to internalize the effect of their R&D expenditures on the profits
of their partners. Let a “competitive externality” represent the marginal effect of the R&D of a firm on
the profits of other firms (this effect is generally non-nil, even when there are no spillovers). In this model
there are three types of competitive externalities: the horizontal competitive externality (H), the vertical
competitive externality (V), and the diagonal competitive externality (D). H represents the sum of the
marginal effects of a firm’s R&D on the profits of its competitors; this externality is internalized in the
HCE and the GCE. H can be positive or negative, depending on whether an increase in R&D by a firm
increases or decreases the profits of its competitors. H increases with horizontal spillovers, and generally
also with vertical spillovers. V represents the sum of the marginal effects of a firm’s R&D on the profits
of its customers/suppliers; this externality is internalized in the VCE and the GCE. It is positive, given
that an increase in R&D by a firm always increases the profits of its customers/suppliers. D represents
the sum of the marginal effects of a firm’s R&D on the profits of firms in the other industry, which are
neither competitors nor customers/suppliers; this externality is always positive, and is internalized in the
GCE only. V and D are always positive, but are larger when horizontal and vertical spillovers are higher.
No competitive externalities are internalized in the NCE. The following lemma characterizes the relation
between competitive externalities and the ranking of TOC.
Lemma 1. Let m=n=2. Let the horizontal competitive externality H be given by
Let the vertical competitive externality V be given by
Let the diagonal competitive externality D be given by
Then, between any two TOC, the one internalizing a larger (more positive) sum of competitive
externalities will yield more R&D.
Proof. The inclusion of positive (negative) externalities in the first order condition of a firm increases
(decreases) its R&D, given that the profit of a firm is concave in its own R&D. 
The comparison between TOC rests on the signs and magnitudes of those externalities: the TOC
Boivin and Vencatachellum (1998) develop a related concept of a competitive externality given by My /Mx . They show22 j i
that this externality is of the same sign as MB /Mx  when demand is linear.j i
I am indebted to Caroline Boivin for suggesting this line of analysis.
23
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yielding more R&D will be the one which internalizes a larger sum of competitive externalities.  This22
is because internalizing a positive competitive externality increases R&D, while internalizing a negative
competitive externality reduces R&D.  This result is quite general, and can be particularly useful in23
comparing different cooperative structures even when no closed form solutions exists or that the levels
of R&D investments are not known. In what follows we use those three competitive externalities to
analyse the classification of TOC.
Before proceeding with the analysis it will be useful to restate the basic result of the strategic
investment literature, that with low horizontal spillovers R&D competition yields more innovation than
(horizontal) R&D cooperation. When h is high, information leakage is important, and firms underinvest.
Consequently cooperation induces them to internalize this positive externality, and R&D is increased.
On the other hand, when h is low, information leakage is negligible, and the private gains from R&D
outweigh the spillover. Accordingly firms give less weight to the spillover, and overinvest in R&D. In
this context intraindustry cooperation reduces R&D, since firms internalize this negative externality. As
the analysis to follow will show, accounting for vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation can seriously
alter this result.
The analysis starts in a bilateral duopoly framework, and the effect of market structure is
introduced later. The following proposition summarizes the ranking of TOC when m=n=2.
Proposition 2. Let m=n=2. Then
a) X >X .VC NC
b) X >X .GC HC
c) sign(X -X )=sign(1-h).VC HC
d) sign(X -X )=sign(1-11h-10v).NC GC
e) sign(X -X )=sign(13-23h-10v).NC HC
f) sign(X -X )=sign(7h+5v-2).GC VC
Proof. These results follow from lemma 1. They can also be obtained by analysing the differences
between total R&D expenditures under pairs of TOC. 
Part a of proposition 2 states that X >X . In the NCE no competitive externality is internalized.VC NC
In the VCE firms internalize the vertical competitive externality, which is always positive, pushing R&D
up. When v>0, firms internalize the effect of their R&D on the production cost and the profits of their
customer/supplier. Even when v=0, firms internalize the effect of their own cost reduction on the increase
in the size of the market and profits of their customer/supplier, thus increasing their R&D compared with
the NCE.
Part b of proposition 2 compares the GCE with the HCE. In all cases X >X . GeneralizedGC HC
cooperation internalizes V, H, and D, while horizontal cooperation internalizes H. Taking the difference
between the two, (V+H+D)-H=V+D>0: generalized cooperation dominates horizontal cooperation
because it internalizes the same horizontal externality (which may be positive or negative, but this is
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irrelevant here) and, in addition, internalizes the positive V and D.
Part c of proposition 2 compares HC with VC. VC dominates, except when h=1, where X =X .VC HC
VC internalizes V, while HC internalizes H. When horizontal spillovers are low, H is negative (because
an increase in R&D by a firm reduces the profits of its competitor), therefore V>H. But even when
horizontal spillovers are high, so that H>0, V is larger than H: the vertical competitive externality
internalized through vertical cooperation is larger than the horizontal competitive externality internalized
through horizontal cooperation. It is only when h=1 that the two TOC yield equal levels of R&D.
The relation between the NCE and the GCE (part d of proposition 2) depends on the levels of
h and v. When h and v are very low, NC dominates, because in that case cooperation between
competitors reduces R&D. The negative horizontal effect dominates the positive vertical and diagonal
effects: *H*>V+D. When h and v are high, the horizontal competitive externality (H) becomes less
negative, and eventually positive, therefore V+D+H>0. In that case X >X . However, contrary toGCE NCE
the established result in the literature, that increase comes for levels of horizontal spillovers much smaller
than h=1/2. In fact, as proposition 2 establishes, even when h=0, GC can increase R&D. This is due to
the presence of the vertical and diagonal competitive externalities, which may dominate the negative H
when horizontal spillovers are low.
Part e of proposition 2 states that X >X  when h and v are low, while the inequality is reversedNC HC
for high spillovers. HC increases R&D compared to NC when H>0, that is, when the horizontal
competitive externality internalized through horizontal cooperation is positive. As explained above, a low
h induces overinvestment in the NCE, therefore HC reduces R&D; conversely, a high h induces
underinvestment in the NCE, therefore HC increases R&D.
The effect of v is novel, however, and needs to be explicited. HC is more likely to increase R&D
when v is high. This result can be understood in terms of the strategic interaction of research efforts. In
the NCE and the HCE, buyers’ research expenditures are strategic substitutes iff 7>11h+4v, and sellers’
research expenditures are strategic substitutes iff 1>2h+v. R&D cooperation between firms whose
research efforts are strategic substitutes (complements) decreases (increases) R&D. v contributes to
strategic complementarity between competitors: a higher v increases the benefit a firm extracts from its
competitor’s R&D, trough the effect of that R&D on the cost of the customer/supplier of the firm. For
instance, an increase in x  benefits b1 directly through h, but also indirectly through the reduction in cb2 s1
(the cost of the supplier of b1) induced by v. As vertical spillovers contribute to horizontal strategic
complementarity, they reduce the level of horizontal spillovers required for HC to increase R&D. In
other words, with high vertical spillovers, horizontal cooperation can increase R&D even with low
horizontal spillovers. This result is contrary to what is established in the literature, and shows the
importance of accounting for vertical spillovers in the analysis of R&D cooperation.
Part f of proposition 2 states that when spillovers are very low, VC dominates GC, while this
relation is reversed for moderate and high spillovers. VC internalizes V, while GC internalizes, H, V and
D. Therefore, X >X  iff H+V+D>V, i.e. iff H+D>0. When spillovers are low, H is negative, andGC VC
dominates the positive D: the negative effect of internalizing the horizontal competitive externality
dominates the positive effect of internalizing the diagonal competitive externality. As horizontal and
vertical spillovers increase, H becomes less negative, and eventually positive, therefore for high spillovers
X >X .GC VC
Note that at v=0 and h=1/2, X >X , while the literature would predict equality between the two TOC in that case.24 NC HC
The reason is that in this model buyers and sellers have different conditions of strategic interaction (as specified above). The line
determining strategic interaction for buyers (7-11h-4v) in the NCE and the HCE lies slightly to the right of the line separating
regions 3 and 4 (13-23h-10v), while the line determining strategic interaction for sellers (1-2h-v) lies slightly to the left of that line.
In fact, the line separating regions 3 and 4 can be expressed as a linear combination of the lines determining strategic interaction
for buyers and sellers, since (7-11h-4v)+6(1-2h-v)=13-23h-10v. Therefore, at v=0 and h=1/2, the passage from NC to HC does not
change sellers’ R&D, but decreases buyers’ R&D, therefore total R&D decreases. On the line separating regions 3 and 4, the
passage from NC to HC increases sellers’ R&D and decreases buyers’ R&D by offsetting amounts.
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The comparisons in proposition 2 have been performed pairwise. It is useful to be able to rank
all TOC for given levels of spillovers. Figure 3 illustrates the ranking of TOC in the hxv space, based on
the conditions stated in proposition 2. This figure is divided into 5 regions, each region being
characterized by a ranking of the TOC. The following table summarizes the relation between the
competitive externalities and the magnitude and sign of H in each region.
[Figure 3 here]
Table 2 - Ranking of types of cooperation
Region Spillovers’ values Competitive externalities Magnitude
(fig. 3)
Ranking of TOC Sign of H
of H
Region 1 v<(1-11h)/10 VC>NC>GC>HC V>0>V+H+D>H *H*>V+D H<0
Region 2 (1-11h)/10<v<(2-7h)/5 VC>GC>NC>HC V>V+H+D>0>H *H*>D H<0
Region 3 (2-7h)/5<v<(13-23h)/10 GC>VC>NC>HC V+H+D>V>0>H *H*<D H<0
Region 4 v>(13-23h)/10, h…1 GC>VC>HC>NC V+H+D>V>H>0 H<V H>0
Region 5 h=1 GC>VC=HC>NC V+H+D>V=H>0 H=V H>0
Region 1 is characterized by low spillovers. In this region VC>NC>GC>HC. H is negative and
sufficiently large to cause the GCE to reduce R&D compared to the NCE. As spillovers increase, we
move into region 2, where the ranking of GC and NC is reversed: VC>GC>NC>HC. H is still negative
enough to outweigh D (therefore X <X ), but not negative enough to outweigh V+D (thereforeGC VC
X >X ). As spillovers increase further, we move into region 3, where GC comes to dominate all otherGC NC
TOC. H is still negative, but is smaller than D, therefore X >X . When spillovers increase further, weGC VC
move into region 4: the horizontal competitive externality becomes positive, therefore X >X .HC NC 24
Finally, when h=1 (region 5), and independently of v, the horizontal competitive externality increases
further: H=V, therefore X =X .HC VC
As we move north-east (i.e. as spillovers increase), the ranking of VC and NC deteriorates, while
the ranking of GC and HC improves. It is surprising that as vertical spillovers increase, the ranking of
VC deteriorates, as it becomes dominated by GC, which has the advantage of allowing competitors to
cooperate, and of inducing a firm to internalize the effect of its R&D on all the firms in the other
industry, and not only on its own supplier/customer (as would be the case with VC). Note that for the
largest part of the spillovers space, GC dominates all other TOC, followed by VC. This shows the
importance of interindustry cooperation, whether there is intraindustry cooperation or not. VC is a
This is in accord with the following quote by Jorde and Teece: “Successful new product and process development
25
innovation often requires horizontal and lateral as well as vertical cooperation.” (Jorde and Teece, 1990:81). Jorde and Teece (1992)
note that horizontal and hybrid (horizontal + vertical) cooperative arrangements face a larger degree of uncertainty from US antitrust
laws.
Numerical simulations are based on the numerical parameterization specified in note 17.
26
On figure 4 curves may overlap for some values of m and n. The labelling of curves corresponds to their ranking at27
m=n=20, but not necessarily to their ranking at other values of m and n.
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complement, not a substitute, to HC.25
Many important results emerge from the preceding analysis. First, one of the basic results of the
strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when
horizontal spillovers are high (low). The model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when
vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. It is necessary to account for the
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal internalization effects in comparing different types of R&D
cooperation. Second, even if all forms of cooperation do not always increase R&D compared with the
NCE, in all cases, at least one form of cooperation does. The only form of cooperation always (strictly)
dominating the NCE is VC. The question of whether cooperation is desirable or not has to be addressed
with reference to specific cooperative schemes. Third, no TOC constantly dominates the others. The
relative efficiency of different TOC cannot be studied without explicit reference to appropriability. This
suggests that optimal structures may vary i) across industries, ii) within the same industry, for different
technologies having different appropriability characteristics, and iii) over time for a given industry, as
technology changes. Finally, comparing parts a and e of proposition 2 shows that there is an important
asymmetry between HC and VC. VC is beneficial irrespective of the level of spillovers, whereas whether
HC is beneficial depends on both horizontal and vertical spillovers. This is because the vertical
internalization effect is always positive, while the horizontal internalization effect may be positive or
negative.
The comparison between TOC has been performed in a bilateral duopoly case. A legitimate
question is how sensitive are the results to this specific market structure. As the analysis to follow shows,
market structure affects the size of the gap between R&D expenditures, and affects the tradeoff between
horizontal and vertical cooperation. To answer that question, we perform the comparison between TOC
for a more general market structure: m=n0[1,20]. While it is possible to study this question for all levels
of m and n within the space defined above, the VCE requires m=n. For the purpose of comparability
between TOC, the analysis is restricted in this section to the case m=n. Moreover, in order to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem, the analysis is restricted to polar appropriability environments: no
spillovers (h=v=0), perfect spillovers (h=v=1), perfect horizontal spillovers only (h=1,v=0), and perfect
vertical spillovers only (h=0,v=1). For brevity’s sake let (h,v) represent appropriability conditions. For
each polar case of spillovers, R&D is ranked across TOC, allowing for a variable market structure.
Numerical simulations are used to compare (not to generate, therefore there is no loss of generality)
elaborate analytical expressions.  While it is possible to compare directly the analytical expressions,26
numerical simulations make the presentation of results, and the comparison between different TOC much
smoother. Figure 4 compares TOC for a given appropriability environment.27
[Figure 4 here]
The same can be said about GC. Moreover, the dominance of the diagonal effect -which may induce cooperation28
between competitors to increase innovation even with a low h- on direct vertical effects can be seen from the large difference
between X and X , compared with the small difference between X and X , on figure 4c.GC NC VC NC
The social optimum could be defined with respect to the levels of output and R&D maximizing the sum of producer
29
and consumer surplus. However, Suzumura (1990) questions the relevance of this “first best” outcome, since governments may
have more latitude in affecting firms’ R&D decisions than in affecting their output decisions. Suzumura adopts a “second best”
concept of the social optimum, where welfare is maximized with respect to R&D, but not with respect to output. This second best
social optimum concept is used here.
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The ranking of TOC at m=n=2 on figure 4 is consistent with proposition 2, and will not be
discussed again. However, two important insights come from the analysis of a more general market
structure. First, figure 4 illustrates an important distinction between horizontal and vertical cooperation
in terms of the magnitudes of the increases and reductions in R&D investments (compared to the NCE)
they cause. VC always increases R&D, while HC may increase or decrease R&D. However, when HC
is beneficial, its benefits compared with the NCE are much larger than the benefits of VC, which are
marginal. Formally, in general *X -X *>*X -X *. This is because the internalization of horizontalHC NC VC NC
spillovers changes the sign of the externality, whereas the internalization of v merely reinforces its
(always positive) effect, without changing its sign. Therefore, even though VC is always beneficial, it is
generally only marginally so. In contrast, when HC is beneficial, its benefits are substantial.28
Second, as figures 4b and 4d show, when h=1, X =X  for m=n=2, but X <X  for all m=n>2.VC HC VC HC
Therefore the result obtained above that in the bilateral duopoly case X $X  is heavily dependent uponVC HC
market structure. With m=n=2, horizontal effects are negligible because of the small number of firms,
and the two TOC yield equal amounts of R&D. However, as competition intensifies the importance of
the horizontal externality increases, and HC, which internalizes this externality, gains in importance. To
see that, note that in a market with m=n firms in each industry, the number of terms constituting H is
2m(m-1), while the number of terms constituting V is 2m. As m increases, the number of terms
constituting H grows much more rapidly (of course the magnitudes of the terms matter, but their number
is indicative of the relative importance of the two effects). Thus, the model provides a preliminary answer
to the question of which is more socially beneficial between horizontal and vertical cooperation. When
horizontal spillovers are low, VC yields more R&D than HC. When horizontal spillovers are high, the
result depends on market structure: VC tends to dominate when m=n=2, but HC yields more R&D for
m=n>2 (moreover, with high concentration HC is more likely to lead to collusion, but this is outside the
scope of the model).
This result shows the importance of analysing the effect of market structure on the relative
desirability of different TOC. For instance, Steurs (1995), who studies spillovers and cooperation
between demand unrelated industries, finds that whether interindustry cooperation is more or less
beneficial depends on spillovers: interindustry cooperation is likely to be more beneficial than
intraindustry cooperation when interindustry spillovers are high and intraindustry spillovers are low.
Here, it is also true that interindustry cooperation is more beneficial when intraindustry spillovers are
low. However, when intraindustry spillovers are high, the result depends on market structure.
A related question is how cooperation affects welfare. Overall there is a monotonic relation
between R&D spending and welfare. A notable exception is when there are no spillovers, where firms
tend to overspend on R&D compared with the social optimum  in the NCE and the VCE. Namely, firms29
This is not the first study to identify instances of overspending on R&D. Suzumura (1992) finds that firms overspend
30
on R&D with no spillovers in the non-cooperative equilibrium (in a one-industry model) when the number of firms is large.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) find that when demand is highly inelastic and that free entry is allowed, R&D spending may exceed
the socially optimal level. Bester and Petrakis (1993), in a model of cost reduction with no spillovers, find that overinvestment in
R&D may occur when goods produced by different firms are close substitutes.
On the input side, Canada, for instance, devotes a relatively low proportion of its resources to R&D compared to most
31
OECD countries. On the output side, studies typically find that the social rate of return on R&D is much higher than the private
rate of return.
It can be easily shown (when m=n=2) that in the NCE and the HCE, buyers’ research expenditures are strategic32
substitutes iff 7>11h+4v, and sellers’ research expenditures are strategic substitutes iff 1>2h+v. In the GCE and the VCE, buyers’
research efforts are strategic substitutes iff -71+182h-71h +40v+40hv+40v <0 and sellers’ research expenditures are strategic2 2
substitutes iff -11+32h-11h +10v+10hv+10v <0. These inequalities imply that horizontal and vertical spillovers induce strategic2 2
complementarity between competitors, and that buyers’ research expenditures are more likely to be strategic substitutes than sellers’
research expenditures. Moreover, research efforts between buyers and sellers are strategic complements in all TOC.
As figure 4c shows, this result may be slightly altered by the presence of vertical spillovers.
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overspend on R&D i) in the NCE, with no spillovers, min{m,n}$3 or {m=2,n$5} or {m$5,n=2}, and
ii) in the VCE, m=n$3 with no spillovers.  Consumer surplus is always higher than in the social30
optimum when there is overspending on R&D. However, one should be cautious before exaggerating
the importance of overspending on R&D. First, the -static- modelization does not necessarily exhaust
all the -static and dynamic- benefits of R&D. Second, empirical studies suggest that usually there is
underinvestment, not overinvestment, in R&D.  Third, the model shows that overspending occurs less31
often, and in smaller magnitudes, than underspending. Finally, although total welfare suffers from this
overspending on R&D, consumers benefit from it.
Spillovers increase the social gains from cooperation. With high spillovers the NCE is more likely
to be dominated by other TOC, whereas the NCE generally dominates (in terms of welfare, at least)
without spillovers. Moreover, by analysing the gap between the NCE and the other TOC, we see that
spillovers increase the value of cooperation, for they increase the inefficiency of the NCE compared with
the social optimum (this is clear form figure 4).
The interactions between h and HC can be understood in terms of the business strategies
taxonomy of Tirole (1989) (see table 3). When h is low and there is no HC or GC, firms adopt a top dog
strategy: R&D investments make the investing firm look tough, by improving its competitive position.
Moreover, in that case reaction functions between competitors are downward sloping,  and this increase32
in R&D by firm i reduces R&D by its competitors. When h is low and there is HC or GC, firms adopt
a puppy dog strategy: each firm reduces its R&D investments, so as to be inoffensive, given that firms
are cooperating.  In that case research efforts within industries are strategic complements, and this33
reduction in R&D reduces competitors’ R&D as well. With high h and no HC or GC, firms adopt a lean
and hungry look: because investments benefit competitors, firms underinvest to be tough. Given that in
that case research efforts within industries are strategic complements, this underinvestment reduces
competitors’ R&D as well. Finally, with high h and HC or GC, firms adopt a fat cat strategy: they want
to look inoffensive, given that they are cooperating; and the best way to achieve that is to invest heavily
in R&D, which benefits competitors. And given that reaction functions are upward sloping in this case,
this overinvestment is matched by overinvestment from competitors.
Except from the move from a bilateral monopoly to a bilateral duopoly. This suggests that, even if it can be argued that
34
competition may hinder innovation in some cases, any competition level less than a duopoly reduces innovation.
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Table 3- Business strategies, cooperation and spillovers
HC or GC NC or VC
Low h puppy dog top dog
High h fat cat lean and hungry look
6. Market Structure and innovation
The relation between competition and innovation can be affected by many factors. One such
factor is the technological environment of the industry. In this model the technological environment is
characterized by appropriability (horizontal and vertical spillovers) and R&D cooperation. We use the
model to analyze how the technological environment affects the relation between competition and
innovation. Moreover, by analysing the upstream and downstream simultaneously, one can assess how
competition and technological opportunities in vertically related markets affect innovation. As Peters
(2000:13) notes: “the conditions on vertically related markets also determine the innovative activities of
firms”.
For the sake of simplicity this analysis is performed for the four polar appropriability
environments described in section 5: (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), (1,1). With four TOC and four appropriability
environments, there are 16 different relations between market structure and R&D. These 16 different
relations can be grouped under three types of relations, shown in figure 5. The vertical axis measures
total R&D output, and the horizontal axes measure industry sizes.
[Figure 5 here]
Figure 5a depicts a positive relation between competition and R&D: both symmetric and
asymmetric increases in competition increase R&D. I call this relationship the Competitive model, and
refer to it as C. Figure 5b depicts a negative relationship between competition and R&D along the
diagonal  as well as for asymmetric increases (except when at least one industry is highly concentrated,34
where the asymmetric effect may be positive). I call this relationship the Schumpeterian model, and refer
to it as S. Figure 5c depicts a rather odd relationship between competition and R&D. A symmetric
increase in the size of the two industries increases R&D; an asymmetric increase in m (holding n
constant) increases R&D for low n and decreases R&D for high n; similarly, an asymmetric increase in
n (holding m constant) increases R&D for low m and decreases R&D for high m. In this configuration,
R&D is maximized when the market structure is very asymmetric. I call this relationship the Asymmetric
model, and refer to it as A.
Table 4 shows the correspondence between couples of cooperation and appropriability, and the
relations described above. No row and no column gives uniformly the same result, implying that the
effect of competition on R&D cannot be predicted without specifying both the appropriability conditions
of the market and the prevailing type of cooperation. In the case of the VCE, the result is determined
along the diagonal m=n, because asymmetric market structures are not allowed. Hence, for the VCE,
In these cases sign(MX/Mk) is determined solely by horizontal effects (which may be positive or negative); vertical effects35
(which are always positive) are always dominated by horizontal effects.
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an increasing R&D along this diagonal indicates either the relation C or the relation A (it is impossible
to differentiate between the two), while a decreasing R&D indicates the relation S.
Note the following regularities. Comparing columns, we see that the NCE and the VCE yield the
same results (subject to the impossibility of distinguishing between C and A under VC). Moreover, GC
and HC yield closely related results, with the difference that C under HC is replaced by A under GC.
Comparing rows, we see that the cases (1,1) and (1,0) yield similar results. Finally, note that A obtains
only with GC.
Table 4 - Effect of competition on total R&D spending
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical
 cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
No spillovers (0,0) C S S C or A
Perfect horizontal spillovers S A C S
No vertical spillovers (1,0)
Perfect vertical spillovers C A C C or A
No horizontal spillovers (0,1)
Perfect spillovers (1,1) S A C S
   C: Competitive; S: Schumpeterian; A: Asymmetric
The change in market structure can take two forms: a simultaneous increase in the number of
firms in both industries, or an increase in the number of firms in one industry only. Consider first a
simultaneous increase in the number of firms in the two industries. The result will be stated in terms of
the horizontal competitive externality, H. Remember that H represents the sum of the marginal effects
of a firm’s R&D on the profits of its competitors; this externality is internalized in both the HCE and the
GCE. H can be positive or negative, depending on whether an increase in R&D by a firm increases or
decreases the profits of its competitors. In general, H is more likely to be positive the higher horizontal
and vertical spillovers are.
Proposition 3. Let k=m=n>2 (an increase in k is a north-east move along the diagonal in figure 5, and
corresponds to a simultaneous and equal increase in the number of firms in the two industries). Let
h,v0{0,1}. Let 8=1 if there is intraindustry cooperation (HC or GC) and let 8=0 otherwise (NC or VC).
Then
sign(MX/Mk) = sign(1+2v(1-h)-2*8-h*).
This implies that:
3a. When h=1 or v=0 (the first, second, and fourth rows of table 4) MX/Mk is of the opposite sign of the
horizontal competitive externality when that externality is not internalized, and is of the same sign as
the horizontal competitive externality when that externality is internalized.
3b. When h=0 and v=1 (the third row of table 4), MX/Mk>0.
The intuition is as follows. Consider first part a of proposition 3.  When a negative competitive35
horizontal externality is not internalized, R&D serves mainly as a competitive tool. Hence MX/Mk>0: as
The often positive effects of competition in this model should be qualified by the fact that the model does not incorporate
36
fixed costs to R&D.
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competition intensifies, firms use more of this competitive tool (each firm’s R&D declines, but total R&D
increases). When the negative competitive horizontal externality is internalized, however, firms use R&D
to increase the total size of the market, benefiting all from this expansion. However, they do not aim at
hurting each other through R&D. Hence an increase in k, which increases the effects of the negative
externality, reduces R&D. Similarly, when a positive competitive horizontal externality is not
internalized, the main effect of R&D is to benefit competitors. Hence an increase in competition increases
the effect of this positive externality on competitors, and R&D decreases. When this positive competitive
externality is internalized, however, firms maximize the benefits from it as k increases, and total R&D
increases.
Consider now part b of proposition 3. Because v is very large compared to h, its positive impact
implies that MX/Mk>0. Horizontal effects are still present, but small: when negative they are dominated
by vertical effects; when positive they reinforce vertical effects.  It is specifically in this case that the36
effect of vertical spillovers on the relationship between competition and innovation is most explicit.
Note that whereas the effect of h depends on whether it is internalized or not, the effect of v is
independent of its internalization. This is because the internalization of h changes the sign of the
externality, whereas the internalization of v merely reinforces its (always positive) effect, without
changing its sign.
Proposition 3 dealt with the effects of symmetric increases in industry sizes. Consider now the
effects of an asymmetric increase in industry size. The fourth column of table 4 is irrelevant here, because
asymmetries are not allowed under VC. An asymmetric increase in competition has a positive effect on
R&D under C, a generally negative effect under S, and an ambiguous effect under A. The asymmetric
effects in the C and S model can be understood by using the same analysis as for symmetric increases in
competition. With either h=1 or v=0, the effect of horizontal externalities dominates. Hence the effect
of an asymmetric increase in industry size is of the same sign as the horizontal competitive externality
if it is internalized, and is of inverse sign if that externality is not internalized. In the fourth case, (0,1),
the result is determined by vertical effects, which are always positive.
The asymmetric effects under the A model can be understood in terms of the vertical and diagonal
competitive externalities. As mentioned earlier, the asymmetric increase in industry size in this case has
an ambiguous effect on R&D: it is positive when the other industry is highly concentrated, and negative
when the other industry is highly competitive. This implies, as figure 5c shows, that R&D is maximized
when one industry is highly concentrated, and the other is highly competitive. The reason for this
asymmetric outcome is that in the A model, the fringe spends more on R&D relative to asymmetric
market structures in the C or the S models. Indeed, in the A cases, when one industry becomes highly
concentrated, the increase in total R&D comes mainly from the fringe, not from the concentrated
industry. The intuition is as follows. The profits of firms in the concentrated industry are higher than
profits of firms in the fringe. With GC, firms maximize joint profits. Firms in the concentrated industry
benefit more from R&D by the fringe the higher spillovers are. With any type of spillovers present, and
with GC, because of the large marginal profits of the concentrated industry, the fringe spends more on
Peters (2000) finds that in the German automobile industry, a higher supplier concentration reduces (stimulates) R&D
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intensity if buyer markets are lowly (highly) concentrated. In the model studied here, the relation between competition and R&D
intensity hinges on spillovers and R&D cooperation. An increase in the number of competitors of a firm increases (decreases) its
R&D intensity when spillovers are high (low) in the NCE and the VCE. Spillovers have the opposite effect in the GCE and the
HCE.
Peters (2000) finds that in the German automobile industry, a small number of suppliers and a large stock of customers
38
stimulate innovative activities. He interprets this outcome in terms of reduced risk for sellers from the opportunistic behaviour of
buyers when the latter are in large number, and in terms of the positive effect of buyers’ number on the potential utilization of the
innovation and the speed of adoption of new technologies. The model proposes an alternative explanation: asymmetric market
structures maximize innovative activities when there is generalized cooperation and there are spillovers.
Poyago-Theotoky (1996) shows that the relation between firm size and cost reduction incentives hinges on the way R&D
39
affects production costs. When costs are affected in an additive (multiplicative) way, large/low cost (small/high cost) firms spend
more (these results were derived between competitors, with no vertical linkages).
Terleckyj (1974) provides an illustration of this situation, where the productivity growth of the airline industry was
40
mainly due to the introduction of quality aircraft by the (competitive) aircraft manufacturing industry. Vanderwerf (1992) finds that
in the commodity materials-using production processes, more concentrated upstream firms are the source of more downstream
innovations when upstream firms are more concentrated, and when downstream firms are less concentrated. This is consistent with
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R&D, given that joint profits are maximized. Moreover, given diseconomies of scale in R&D, substantial
collective benefits from R&D (high spillovers), and asymmetric market structures, total R&D costs are
minimized when the fringe undertakes more R&D than the concentrated industry. In a sense, the fringe
gets exploited by the concentrated industry, and it is happy to be so. Indeed, by comparing profits, we
see that the ratio of profits of each firm in the concentrated industry to the profits of each firm in the
fringe is highest with the Asymmetric model. With no spillovers, this effect does not arise, because the
benefit of the concentrated industry from the fringe’s R&D is more limited.  The Asymmetric model37 38
obtains only with GC, because this is the only TOC internalizing simultaneously vertical and diagonal
competitive externalities.
To summarize, the relation between competition and innovation can be understood in terms of
the three competitive externalities. When H dominates, the effect of competition on innovation is of the
same sign as that externality if it is internalized, and of the opposite sign if it is not internalized. When
V dominates, the effect of competition is always positive. When D dominates (and that it is internalized),
it is generally the Asymmetric model that prevails.
The effect of competition on innovation in a given industry cannot be fully understood without
specifying the appropriability conditions and the cooperative relations in the industry as well as in
adjacent industries. Teece (1992) suggests that “Discussions of the link between firm size and innovation
are outmoded because the boundaries of the firm have become fuzzy”, due to strategic alliances. Our
model shows that strategic alliances can alter the relation between market structure and innovation, but
in no way does the question become obsolete.
Changes in total R&D may hide important different sectoral effects. Upstream and downstream
R&D expenditures may move in different directions. For instance, starting from a symmetric market
structure, an equal increase in the size of the two industries increases the share of buyers in total R&D
in the NCE and the HCE. With an asymmetric market structure each firm in the more concentrated
industry spends more than each firm in the less concentrated industry.  A similar result is obtained by39
Peters (1995). The fruits of innovation by the (more) competitive industry accrue mainly to the
oligopolistic industry, because of the limited market power of firms in the competitive industry.  This40
the predictions of the model regarding the relation between concentration and R&D. Here, however, upstream firms cannot originate
downstream innovations as such.
Some studies endogenize the formation and the stability of research joint ventures (De Bondt et al., 1992; Poyago-
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Theotoky, 1995; Kamien and Zang, 1993; Eaton and Eswaran, 1997; Kesteloot and Veuglelers, 1995; Yi, 1998).
The higher profitability of sellers does not hold for all strategic variables. For instance, when firms use a percentage
42
mark-up rule for pricing, downstream firms make more profits (Irmen, 1997). Moreover, Choe (1998) shows that with a general
demand, "=n/(n+1+2), where 2 is the quantity elasticity of the slope of the retail demand function.
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asymmetry in the distribution of the benefits of R&D is reinforced by, but does not require, vertical
spillovers. Regarding the effect of spillovers, an increase in (either type of) spillovers increases the share
of the more concentrated industry in the NCE, and reduces it in all other TOC.
7. Private incentives for cooperation
This section addresses the private incentives for cooperation.  The question is: under a41
decentralized negotiation mechanism, do firms, and under what circumstances, decide to cooperate? And
when they do, do they choose the socially optimal type of cooperation? This question is important,
because regulators need not provide incentives for R&D cooperation when cooperation arises from
decentralized negotiations. Moreover, regulators need not prohibit cooperation when firms have no
interest in cooperating. In some cases, however, incentives or prohibition may be necessary.
First firms’ profits across different TOC are ranked based on numerical simulations. For the sake
of simplicity, this analysis is performed in the case m=n=2. Tables 5 and 6 present the ranking of profits
of buyers and sellers across TOC for different appropriability environments.
The comparison of profits shows that firms will always prefer to cooperate, even though they
may have different preferences as to the choice of a TOC. Some forms of cooperation can cause losses
to firms compared with the NCE. Buyers generally prefer the HCE, except when there are only vertical
spillovers, in which case they prefer the VCE. Sellers always prefer the GCE. Buyers generally prefer HC
to VC, whereas sellers, in contrast, always prefer VC to HC.
The explanation of these divergent preferences lies in the asymmetric distribution of R&D
between the two industries. In this model there is a general tendency for buyers to spend less on R&D
than sellers when there is no interindustry cooperation (i.e. under NC and HC). This tendency of
upstream firms to do more R&D than downstream firms is rooted at the heart of the vertical market
structure. It is a fundamental property of vertical structures with equal numbers of buyers and sellers that
sellers’ profits are always higher than buyers’. Moreover, the marginal effect of a dollar of R&D on
profits is higher for sellers than for buyers. In a vertical market without R&D, with linear demand,
constant marginal costs (but not necessarily equal between buyers and sellers), quantities as strategic
variables, m=n, and "/B /B , it is straightforward to verify that "=n/(n+1).  When R&D is added tobi si
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the model the ratio becomes more complicated, but it remains true that "<1 and lim "=1. As m=nn÷4
grow the asymmetries in profits and in profits’ sensitivity to changes in parameters become negligible,
reducing the asymmetries in behaviour between buyers and sellers. Therefore, when taking their decisions
independently from sellers (NC or HC), buyers spend less on R&D than sellers, because they make less
profits. With VC or GC, buyers are forced to take into account the effect of their R&D on sellers’ profits,
This explains also why in all cases where buyers prefer HC to VC, they prefer GC to VC: GC, while implying some form43
of vertical cooperation, also incorporates horizontal cooperation.
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and this induces an increase in buyers’ R&D, and a decrease in sellers’ R&D.43
Table 5 - Ranking of buyers’ profits (based on numerical simulations)
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
No spillovers (0,0) 2 3 1 4
Perfect horizontal spillovers 4 2 1 3
No vertical spillovers (1,0)
Perfect vertical spillovers 3 4 2 1
No horizontal spillovers (0,1)
Perfect spillovers (1,1) 4 2 1 3
Table 6 - Ranking of sellers’ profits (based on numerical simulations)
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
No spillovers (0,0) 4 1 5 1
Perfect horizontal spillovers 5 1 4 3
No vertical spillovers (1,0)
Perfect vertical spillovers 5 1 4 3
No horizontal spillovers (0,1)
Perfect spillovers (1,1) 5 1 4 3
To illustrate this result consider the move from HC to VC. For all polar cases of spillovers, sellers
gain from this move; and for all polar cases of spillovers except (0,1), buyers lose. The explanation is as
follows. Consider first the case (0,0). In this case x <x , and x =x . Moreover, x <x  and x <x .HC HC VC VC HC VC HC VCb i s i b i s i b i b i s i s i
These inequalities imply that R&D increases for all firms with the move from HC to VC, but increases
more for buyers. This increase in total R&D triggers an output expansion. However, this output
expansion is marginal, because the decline in the transfer price and in the final price are small. Moreover,
the sellers’ margin is higher, and they benefit more from this output expansion. Hence, buyers benefit
less from this output expansion, and have to bear a larger increase in R&D costs than sellers. It turns out
that the higher additional revenues of sellers are sufficient to cover their modest increase in R&D, but
that the small increase in buyers’ revenues is insufficient to cover their large increase in R&D. Therefore
buyers’ profits decline and sellers’ profits increase in the passage from HC to VC with spillovers (0,0).
Consider next the cases (1,0) and (1,1). In these cases x <x , and x =x . However, X =X .HC HC VC VC VC HCb i s i b i s i
Hence total R&D remains unchanged but buyers increase, and sellers decrease, their R&D. The size of
the market is hardly affected, and buyers have to spend more on R&D. Naturally, their profits fall
compared to HC, while sellers, who reduce their R&D, see their profits increase.
Finally, this result does not obtain in the case (0,1). In this case, the importance of v relative to
A complete stability analysis would require the study of the incentives of each firm and each possible coalition of firms
44
to deviate, in each situation. Given that there are four strategies (TOC), four games (appropriability environments), and two types
of firms, this would be exhaustive. Instead, stability is studied at the industry level: firms within a given industry always play the
same strategy. Moreover, in principle, it would be possible to have asymmetric strategies. For instance, one industry could choose
horizontal cooperation whereas firms in the other industry prefer not to cooperate among themselves. However, the payoffs
presented in tables 5 and 6 are based on symmetric choices of cooperation, and this case is therefore not considered.
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h makes VC beneficial to all firms. And given that h is very low, HC is not particularly attractive.
Buyers’ lower innovation is a consequence -not a cause- of their lower profitability, which is due
to the structure of the output market. By cooperating on technology with sellers, buyers are attacking
the symptom rather than the cause of their inferior position. Technological cooperation, while it increases
buyers’ innovation, reduces their profits, because it forces them to align their innovation rate on more
innovative, more powerful, and more profitable firms. Total profits increase with cooperation, but the
redistribution of profits is in favour of sellers and at the expense of buyers. This result illustrates how
firms seeking technological agreements to solve deeper problems may exasperate these problems instead
of alleviating them.
Using firms’ profits, the stability of cooperation is now analysed. We look for the TOC which
firms would agree upon for each appropriability environment. This game can be seen as an initial stage
being played before the three-stage game involving R&D, upstream output, and downstream output, is
played. The strategies at this stage are TOC. Each industry chooses a TOC, given appropriability. If the
two industries agree on a TOC, this setting is implemented. If no TOC constitutes a Nash equilibrium,
the NCE is implemented.  There are four games, one for each appropriability environment. The payoffs44
are based on profit rankings as presented in tables 5 and 6. Table 7 indicates those TOC which form Nash
equilibria in each game (each row represents a game). Only pure strategies are considered. In order to
compare firms’ preferences to social preferences, table 8 presents the ranking of welfare levels.
In the two games with (1,1) and (1,0), all TOC form Nash equilibria. Although optimal TOC
could arise in a decentralised manner, there is no guarantee that they will. With no spillovers, the only
Nash equilibrium is the NCE. As table 8 shows, in this case W >W : the optimal TOC cannot beVC NC
decentralized. Finally, with vertical spillovers all TOC constitute Nash equilibria, except the GC. It
happens that, as table 8 shows, this is the optimal TOC in this case.
Table 7- Nash equilibria
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
No spillovers (0,0) *
Perfect horizontal spillovers * * * *
No vertical spillovers (1,0)
Perfect vertical spillovers * * *
No horizontal spillovers (0,1)
Perfect spillovers (1,1) * * * *
   * An asterisk indicates a Nash equilibrium
For instance, Steurs assumes that convergence between profitability and welfare is sufficient: “the type of cooperative
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agreement which is preferred by the firms because it results in the highest profitability, typically also results in the highest total
welfare.” (Steurs 1994:88). In the same spirit, Leahy and Neary (1997) argue that increased profitability to all firms from
cooperation is sufficient to induce cooperation.
As Baumol notes: “with little protection available from the patent system, Japanese innovators appear to have been
46
driven to create profitable technology-sharing agreements with competitors and others” (1997:19).
A drawback to this analysis of the incentives for cooperation is its overlooking of the high transaction costs of R&D
47
cooperation. R&D production, R&D cooperation and, more generally, knowledge, are characterised by high transaction costs. These
are the costs of building and maintaining multi-firm cooperation, of leakage of information about technology and about strategies
behind the technology, and of monitoring opportunistic behaviour (Fransman, 1990). For a discussion of the high transaction costs
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Table 8- Ranking of welfare levels (based on numerical simulations) (m=n=2)
No Generalized Horizontal Vertical Social
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation optimum
No spillovers (0,0) 3 4 5 1 1
Perfect horizontal spillovers 5 2 4 3 1
No vertical spillovers (1,0)
Perfect vertical spillovers 4 2 5 3 1
No horizontal spillovers (0,1)
Perfect spillovers (1,1) 5 2 4 3 1
Many observations can be made based on the preceding strategic interaction analysis. First,
multiple equilibria arise in all appropriability environments, except when there are no spillovers. Second,
the NCE is always an equilibrium, even when there exist other equilibria which are more profitable to
both buyers and sellers. By comparing the results of table 7 with those of table 8 (welfare ranking), we
see that the decentralized equilibria may diverge largely from those TOC which are socially desirable.
Firms are often caught in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Third, the divergence between sellers’ and
buyers’ interests shows the importance of the bargaining process in R&D cooperation. Any form of
asymmetry between firms can induce them to have different preferences with respect to cooperative
settings. This negotiation dimension is often neglected in the theoretical study of R&D agreements.
Early studies of strategic R&D concluded from the social benefits of cooperation that R&D
support by the government is desirable. Later, some authors argued that because cooperation is also
privately beneficial to firms, public intervention is not necessary.  In the stability analysis it was shown45
how the profitability of some cooperative settings was not sufficient for them to arise as a result of
decentralized negotiations. Conversely, cooperation settings benefiting firms do not always benefit
society. Our analysis shows that the outcome of negotiation between asymmetric firms may result in
something that is both socially and privately inferior. Government intervention on this dimension will be
justified when private incentives (of both parties, or of the party capable of imposing its preferred TOC)
diverge from the second-best alternative.
Table 7 shows that with no spillovers firms have no incentives to cooperate. Hence, not only does
a strict patent policy reduce the diffusion of the innovation, but it also makes cooperative R&D less
attractive to firms. The model is consistent with the high rate of R&D cooperation in Japan, since it
predicts an inverse relation between appropriability and R&D cooperation.46 47
associated with knowledge and R&D, see Lee (1994). Moreover, different types of cooperation may have different transaction costs
(I thank Michel Patry for this insight): one would expect that the hazards of horizontal cooperation are more important than the
hazards of vertical cooperation.
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8. Conclusions
This paper focussed on vertical interindustry spillovers and vertical R&D cooperation between
firms. Whereas horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease innovation and welfare depending on
prevailing cooperation types, vertical spillovers always increase them. Cooperative settings were
compared in terms of R&D. It was shown that no type of cooperation uniformly dominates the others.
The type of cooperation yielding more R&D depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and
market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three
competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a
firm on the profits of other firms. The type of cooperation inducing firms to internalize a larger positive
sum of competitive externalities yields more R&D. In particular, one of the basic results of the strategic
investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when
horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model showed that this result does not necessarily hold when
vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. 
A theory of innovation and market structure was proposed: it was shown that the effect of
competition in one industry on total innovation depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers,
cooperative settings, and competition in the other industry. The relation between competition and
innovation can be understood in terms of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal competitive externalities.
When the horizontal competitive externality dominates, the effect of competition on innovation is of the
same sign as that externality if it is internalized, and of the opposite sign if it is not internalized. When
the vertical competitive externality dominates, the effect of competition is always positive. When the
diagonal competitive externality dominates (and that it is internalized), it is generally the Asymmetric
model that prevails.
Finally, the analysis of the private incentives for cooperation showed that buyers and sellers have
different preferences over cooperative settings: sellers prefer vertical cooperation, whereas buyers
(generally) prefer horizontal cooperation. Higher spillovers increase the likelihood of cooperation, but
the multiplicity of equilibria makes the decentralized choice of socially optimal cooperative settings
uncertain.
An important question that arises in the study of vertical vs. horizontal cooperation and spillovers
is their relative importance for firms’ innovation and production decisions. The model suggests that
horizontal spillovers have more impact on firms’ decisions than vertical spillovers. A corollary is that
horizontal cooperation, which internalizes those horizontal externalities, has more impact than vertical
cooperation. For instance, when both types of spillovers are present, the effects of horizontal spillovers
tend to dominate those of vertical spillovers. Also, in general, a change in the level of vertical spillovers
affects the results quantitatively, while a change in the level of horizontal spillovers can affect the results
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Moreover, vertical cooperation is (almost) always beneficial, but
it increases R&D only marginally relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium; whereas horizontal
cooperation can increase or decrease R&D, but always significantly relative to the non-cooperative
29
equilibrium. These observations are (generally) verified in figure 4 (comparison of types of cooperation),
table 4 (market structure effects), tables 5 and 6 (buyers’ and sellers’ profits), and table 8 (Nash
equilibria). This difference can be explained by the fact that the vertical competitive externality, even
when it is not internalized, benefits the innovating firm because of the reduction in the total production
cost of the final product. In contrast, the horizontal competitive externality does not always benefit the
innovating firm: this depends on its sign, and its internalisation.
The identification of different types of interindustry spillovers is important for the empirical study
of technology flows. Empirical studies have typically classified R&D spillovers into two types:
interindustry and intraindustry spillovers. The contrast of some of our results with Steurs (1994,1995)
-who studies spillovers between demand unrelated industries- shows the necessity to distinguish between
spillovers between vertically related industries and those between demand unrelated industries, in
addition to the classical distinction of intraindustry/interindustry spillovers.
The study of R&D cooperation and of the protection of innovation inevitably raises important
science and technology policy issues. Carefulness is required in drawing policy recommendations from
this model because it abstracts from many real world issues, especially asymmetric information between
policymakers and firms. Nonetheless the model provides some reflections on R&D policy from the point
of view of the incentives for cooperation, mergers, and vertical integration.
The model argues for a customized policy toward R&D, as opposed to across the board
standardized R&D policies. The optimal R&D policy varies according to horizontal spillovers, vertical
spillovers, and the prevailing type of R&D cooperation. Levin et al. (1987:816) reached a similar
conclusion when they noted that “the incremental effects of policy changes should be assessed at the
industry level”. They further note that the impact of innovation protection depends on the extent of other
appropriability mechanisms, which are industry specific.
Beyond traditional R&D policy tools, the model suggests that the choice of cooperative settings
and of incentives to cooperation, taking appropriability into account, is crucial for the determination of
R&D levels and distribution. This approach should be seen as a complement, rather than as a substitute,
to traditional policy leverages.
The model predicts that spillovers increase the gains -to firms and to society- from cooperation,
so it can be argued that higher spillovers should induce more R&D incentives. However, spillovers also
increase the likelihood that firms will cooperate: when spillovers are high, many or all TOC constitute
Nash equilibria, and one could hence argue that firms would cooperate because it is profitable for them
to do so. On the other hand, with multiple equilibria, there is no guarantee that firms will choose
cooperation over no cooperation, or that they will choose the socially optimal type of cooperation.
The interpretation of the choice of TOC should be broader than the special cooperative settings
studied here. In the model different combinations of vertical and horizontal cooperation were considered.
However, cooperation has many other dimensions. The same basic problem arising here with respect to
the choice of the -privately or socially- preferred types of cooperation is expected to arise, at a much
larger scale, when all the richness of cooperative settings is considered: choice of research projects,
extent of cooperation, information sharing, enforcement mechanisms, intellectual property rights, etc.
This gives the government a larger scope for intervention.
Examples are production of a technology of the lower common denominator (Dodgson, 1994), reduction in the
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diversification of research paths, barriers to entry, elimination of competitors, output collusion, and collusion to control the
technological cycle.
This is the case, for instance, within SEMATECH (the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium), where
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large semiconductor firms cooperate with small semiconductor materials and equipment suppliers.
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The model emphasized the vertical dimension of innovation, in terms of vertical R&D spillovers
and vertical R&D cooperation. Geroski (1992) has made a clear call for more focus on the role of
vertical relations, and perhaps less on horizontal relations, which can lead to collusion on the output
market. Vertical cooperation does not bring with it all the potentially anti-competitive effects of
horizontal research joint ventures.  Moreover, vertical cooperation may require less incentives than48
horizontal cooperation, for it is easier to induce firms into cooperating with suppliers/distributors than
into cooperating with competitors.
The results have implications for merger analysis. Mergers usually entail the use of R&D -in
addition to output- to maximize joint profits. Economists have tended to focus on the output effects of
mergers; more attention needs to be drawn to the innovation effects of mergers. The results show that
the innovation effects of horizontal mergers, apart from any output distortions, depend on the level of
horizontal spillovers. Depending on the appropriability conditions and the type of R&D cooperation
prevailing before the merger, the merger may reinforce or mitigate the negative effect of output reduction
by increases or reductions in innovation. For instance, regulators should be severe regarding mergers
where output decisions are joint but where R&D decisions remain separate. The innovation effects of
vertical mergers also need to be considered: vertical integration makes vertical R&D cooperation
intrinsic to the structure of the firm, thus increasing R&D.
The model has many possible extensions. An important type of vertical cooperation that has not
been addressed by the paper is vertical cooperation when the upstream sector is the developer of the
innovation and the downstream sector is the user of the innovation. It was assumed that upstream and
downstream firms conducted the same type of research. In real markets, downstream firms are closer
to the final user, and may be engaged in more applied research, whereas upstream levels may be
conducting more fundamental research. Insofar as appropriability problems are thought to be more
severe in basic research than in applied research (Arrow, 1962), spillovers between suppliers may be
higher than spillovers between buyers. This in turn may affect the symmetry of vertical spillovers
assumed in this paper. Finally, when the levels of concentration in the upstream and downstream
industries are very different, vertical cooperation takes place between firms of different sizes, and
therefore of different technological, financial, and managerial capabilities.49
Figure 1
Types of cooperation (TOC)
Seller 1  ... Seller n
No cooperation
Buyer 1  ... Buyer m
Seller 1  ... Seller n
Generalized
cooperation
Buyer 1  ... Buyer m
Seller 1  ... Seller n
Horizontal
cooperation
Buyer 1  ... Buyer m
Seller 1 Seller n
Vertical  ...
cooperation*
Buyer 1 Buyer m
A block represents a group of cooperating firms
* With vertical cooperation, where each buyer cooperates with one seller, symmetric strategies require
     imposing the restriction m=n.
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